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New minor political parties and their candidates face many challenges.  Most of challenges have 
been examined on the national level in the previous literature.  By examining ballot access laws 
and campaign finance regulations in all 50 U.S. states, this thesis argues that differences in the 
restriction to ballot access and campaign finance laws account for some of the variation in the 
number of new minor party candidates who run for governor in each state as well as the 
percentage of the vote they receive.  Using a coding for ballot access laws and campaign finance 
stringency, as well as several control variables, this thesis finds that both ballot access laws and 
campaign finance regulations play a role in determining the number of new minor political party 
candidates who appear on the ballot for governor across the states.  At the same time, however, 
the analysis finds no support that either variable has any impact on the percentage of the vote 












 Since very early in its political history, the United States has been dominated by a two-
party political system.1  Throughout the years, the two major parties have enacted laws and rules 
to keep the American election system that way.  It started at the very beginning with the single-
member district plurality election laws that were adopted in almost every state for electing 
governors and other representatives for political offices.  While George Washington, the father 
of our country, was against the United States developing a political party system, it was just a 
matter of time after he left office before the two-party system emerged.  Over time, election laws 
were reformed, but the laws usually only helped the two major parties which wrote the laws, not 
the minor parties that had very little voice in policy decisions.  In 1974, the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA) was enacted in order to reduce the influence of money on campaigns and 
voting after Watergate.2   FECA allocated large sums of money on a prorated basis to any 
political party or candidate which received at least five percent of the national vote in the 
previous presidential election.3  However, due to the five percent rule the reform ended up being 
a “major party protection act” as it further marginalized challenges from minor parties in 
presidential elections by keeping any public funds away from minor party candidates.4  When 
minor party candidates manage to surpass the five percent of the vote threshold placed on federal 
campaign dollars, their allocation is prorated based on the percentage of the vote they got, which 
is always far less than the money the two major parties receive. Recently, however, there has 
been a slight movement toward making it easier for minor party candidates to be successful on 
the state level.  Some states have relaxed their ballot access laws to allow for easier entry by 
                                                 
1 Ranney and Kendall 1956 
2 Gillespie 1993, 31. 
3 Gillespie 1993, 32. 
4 Rosenstone 1996, 26. 
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minor candidates onto the ballot.  In 2004, Louisiana changed its laws to allow any party with 
1,000 signatures of registered voters and $1,000 to become an official party and appear on the 
ballot.  Maryland has changed their ballot access laws twice in recent history.  Before 1998, 
minor party candidates in Maryland had to collect signatures totaling 3% of the voter turnout 
from the previous gubernatorial election.  For the 1998 and 2002 election, the law was changed 
to require only 1% of voter’s signature.  Maryland again amended their ballot access laws before 
the 2006 election to require a flat rate of 10,000 signatures to appear on the ballot.  Under the 1% 
requirements, minor party candidates would have had to collect 14,210 signatures in 1998 and 
15,360 signatures in 2002.  Other states, such as Arizona and Minnesota, have changed their 
campaign finance laws to level the playing field for candidates and parties that do not have high 
levels of donations and contributions to their campaigns.  
Ballot access restrictions and campaign finance laws vary tremendously between states.  
My project intends to determine if this variation can help explain and predict new minor party 
emergence and success in those state’s highest executive office, governor.  Do ballot access laws 
actually influence the number of new minor party candidates on the ballot or the percentage of 
vote won by minor candidates?  Do more stringent campaign finance laws, by creating a more 
level playing field, allow new minor party candidates to become more competitive with the 
major party candidates for governor?  What other factors out there play a role in determining the 
electoral fate of minor party candidates? 
It is important to look at election laws on a state level for many reasons.  Supreme Court 
Justice Louis Brandeis acknowledged that states can serve as a laboratory setting for trying out 
new policies and observing what impact those policies might have.  These “laboratories of 
democracy” suggest that policy innovation can come from states much easier than from the 
2 
 
national government since the policies they enact do not impact the entire nation.  Political 
parties vary across states, and so are the laws that govern them.  This variation is critical in order 
to study the impact of ballot access laws, campaign finance reform, and many other factors that 
influence our political system. 
Ballot access laws to some degree restrict the level of democracy by limiting the number 
of people who are allowed to run for public office.  If more restrictive laws have a negative 
impact on the number of candidates who run for office, then those laws also restrict the voices of 
people who do not believe that either of the two major parties offers a platform with which they 
agree.  It is very possible that people will eventually demand more than two choices; in fact, as 
can be seen by past votes for minor party candidates, many people already do.  Minor parties 
have many hurdles to overcome to be successful, and it is important to know how large of an 
impact ballot access laws have in determining their emergence and success.  Likewise, it is 
important to study the impact of different campaign finance laws in order to determine if those 
policies actually have the desired effects or any unintended consequences.       
 Minor parties themselves offer new and innovative ways of looking at government.  
Many times they are very specific in what their policy goals are, such as the “Legalize Marijuana 
Party”.  Other prominent minor parties such as the Libertarian Party, Reform Party, and Green 
Party have broad platforms and goals that could potentially offer viable alternatives to the 
Republican and Democratic parties.  By examining factors which will help us better explain and 
predict minor party development in gubernatorial races across the states, we can further our 
knowledge of the impact of election laws and regulations, as well as know how to change the 




B.  REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 There is an abundant literature on minor parties in the United States, however most of 
this literature focuses on minor parties at the national level.  Most previous studies about the 
difficulties of minor party candidates look at campaign finance, ballot access laws, or other 
possible influences on presidential elections.  These laws are generally different than the laws in 
each state that apply to candidates for governor.  One thing that does remain constant is the 
presence of the single-member district plurality election system in almost every state.  Louisiana 
is an exception, which uses the French Ballot system that frequently creates a runoff between the 
top two vote getters in the first election, guaranteeing a winner with the support of a majority of 
the voters.  Still, there are no governors that win office through parliamentary-style systems, nor 
are there proportional representation systems that cause the formation of coalition governments.  
Duverger’s Principle asserts that the “simple majority single ballot system favors the two party 
system” whereas “both the simple-majority system with second ballot and proportional 
representation favor multi-partyism.”5  Most of the states use a single-member district plurality 
system, and for this reason it is not entirely realistic to believe that multiple parties will exist for 
any appreciable amount of time.  As an exception to this rule, Louisiana employs a majority 
system with a second “runoff” ballot.  However, I will argue that state ballot access laws have 
created an environment where minor parties have found it difficult to flourish. 
 For a first look at minor parties in the states I turned to Third Parties in America: Citizen 
Response to Major Party Failure by Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus as well as Politics at the 
Periphery: Third Parties in Two-Party America by Gillespie.  Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 
argue that third parties emerge with economic or social problems that are seen as being handled 
                                                 
5 Duverger 1954, 217-239. 
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ineffectively by the two major parties.  From there they go on to explain many of the problems 
that third party candidates face when running for office.  The first of these is access to the ballot.  
If a minor party candidate cannot get listed on the ballot, then they have no chance of winning.  
According to Rosenstone et al., getting on the ballot is usually “an arduous task for third party 
contenders, even well-financed ones.”6  Certainly a candidate for President has a much greater 
task since they have to overcome these barriers in all fifty states, but the fact remains that even 
for gubernatorial candidates there is a hurdle to jump over.  Stratmann studied the impact of 
ballot access laws on the number of candidates who ran in state lower house elections in 1998 
and 2000.  He suggested that incumbents have incentives to use ballot access restrictions to 
shield themselves from competition and to reduce the entry of challengers.  His findings show 
that both increased filing fees as well as larger signature requirements both negatively impacted 
the number of candidates who ran in lower house elections in the American states.7
 The second major setback that minor party candidates face is that of financial barriers.  
Gillespie mentions that “most third parties lack the resources to purchase access to the public via 
expensive newspaper, radio, and television advertising.”8  Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus note 
that minor parties on average are able to afford one-twentieth the television and radio air time 
that major parties can afford.9  Money typically does not roll into the coffers of minor parties 
like it does for the major parties because they have smaller resource bases without the 
fundraising networks to raise money like the major parties do.  The “wasted vote” problem, 
which says that many potential contributors do not make donations because they see the 
campaign as a losing cause, is another challenge to minor parties.  Minor parties also lack the 
                                                 
6 Rosenstone et al. 1996, 20. 
7 Stratmann 2004, 12-14. 
8 Gillespie 1993.  32-33. 
9 Rosenstone et al. 1996, 30. 
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sponsorship of major interest groups like business and labor which are already tied to the major 
parties.10   
 While minor parties suffer from “fundraising” barriers that certainly put major party 
candidates at an advantage, campaign finance reform laws may actually work in favor of minor 
parties.  Laws that regulate the amount of money political campaigns can raise and spend will, in 
theory, negatively affect major parties but have little to no impact on minor party candidates.  
Malbin and Gais state that “public financing and expenditure limits are intended to keep election 
spending down, and thereby, make elections more competitive and equitable.”11  Gross and 
Goidel argue that “reformers want spending limits and public financing for more offices and 
races, with a more equal distribution of public funds among candidates.”12  Witko coded state 
public financing and expenditure limit laws for seven items.  His measure is what I use for the 
campaign finance stringency variable and will be explained in more detail later in this paper.  
Witko’s work comes after looking at campaign finance regulation literature by other scholars 
who studied both the causes (Pippen, Bowler, and Donovan, 2002) and the effects (Gierzynski, 
2002; Gross and Goidel, 2003) of these laws.  Witko uses twenty-two dummy variables in three 
different categories (contribution limits, disclosure requirements, and public financing of 
campaigns combined with spending limits) that indicate whether a state’s regulations contain 
certain provisions.13
 There is extensive literature analyzing the impact of campaign spending in congressional 
elections, state legislative elections, and statewide initiatives and refenda, however there have 
                                                 
10 Lentz 2002, 81. 
11 Malbin and Gais 1998. 
12 Gross and Goidel 2003. 
13 Witko 2005, 302. 
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been very few studies looking at money in elections for state governors.14  Partin executed one of 
the few studies to tackle this issue head on and finds that “spending by gubernatorial contestants 
dramatically influences the outcomes of these races, matching or even out-performing previous 
studied predictors of gubernatorial election outcomes.”15  For this reason I believe that it is 
important to look at the stringency of campaign finance laws when trying to analyze minor party 
vote share in gubernatorial races.  There is a void in previous literature relating minor party 
candidate success or failure to campaign finance laws.  Since money has a large effect on the 
outcome of elections, laws that limit campaign expenditures and level the public financing 
playing field should have a positive impact on the success of minor party candidates.   
VENTURA’S ELECTION 
 One of the only true success stories of minor parties in gubernatorial elections was the 
1998 election for the governor of Minnesota in which Jesse Ventura, a candidate for the Reform 
Party, won with 37 percent of the vote.  Lentz told the story of the election from filing to election 
day and then followed that up with lessons for political science.  He explained who voted for 
Ventura and why in eight unique theories, many of which could be applied to other minor party 
candidates as well.  Put together, these theories paint an accurate picture of who voted for 
Ventura, which Lentz argues was not just a celebrity success.16  Lentz explores the roles of new 
voters, the youth vote, the theory of dudes, disaffected democrats, suburbanites, anger, 
candidate-based votes, and issue-based votes.17   
Most importantly, Lentz finds that Ventura’s success as a minor party candidate for 
governor was due to the reduction of third-party barriers in the state of Minnesota.  Ballot access 
                                                 
14 Partin 2002, 213-214. 
15 Partin 2002, 213. 
16 Lentz 2002, 103-107. 
17 Lentz 2002, 65-78. 
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was not a factor for Ventura.  As the nominee of the Reform Party, Ventura was automatically 
placed on the ballot due to success of Ross Perot in the 1992 presidential election and Dean 
Barkley’s Senate campaigns in 1994 and 1996.18  In all three of these races, the Reform Party 
candidate received over five percent (5%) of the vote, which qualified the party for automatic 
ballot access in the next election.  Financial barriers were also reduced in Minnesota.  
Minnesota’s campaign financing system, compared to most states or national rules, does not put 
minor parties at nearly as bad of a disadvantage with the major parties.  This system qualified the 
Reform Party and Ventura for over $326,000 in public money, which allowed Ventura’s 
campaign to purchase air time to run four effective television advertisements during the last 
week of the campaign.19  In addition to these public financing measures, Minnesota also placed 
spending limits on campaigns for any candidate who accepts public funds.  In the 1998 election, 
the spending limit for every candidate ended up being between $2.1 and $2.3 million.  Coleman 
and Humphrey, the Republican and Democrat in the race, each spent their maximum of $2.1 
million while Ventura was able to spend slightly more than $626,000.20  Compared 
proportionally to other minor party candidates in any kind of election, this was a huge amount.   
Lentz also explains some other very relevant barriers that face minor party candidates at 
almost every level of government.  These factors almost certainly have an impact on success in 
gubernatorial elections and would be great topics to look at for future research.  According to 
Lentz, the biggest barrier other than ballot access and financial structures is debate 
participation.21  Debates allow minor candidates to add legitimacy and credibility to their 
campaigns as well as to be seen by the public and perhaps come across as smarter, more 
                                                 
18 Lentz 2002, 81. 
19 Lentz 2002, 82. 
20 Lentz 2002, 84. 
21 Lentz 2002, 86. 
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charismatic, and better candidates than their major party counterparts.  Media coverage is also 
typically a major barrier to minor parties as it is hard to come by for minor candidates but adds 
legitimacy and recognition to any campaign, especially when the media coverage is positive as it 
usually was in Ventura’s case.22
Lentz’s book served as both a case study for one of the more intriguing elections in recent 
history as well as an analysis of minor party barriers in gubernatorial elections.  He made points 
which reinforced my theories that barriers to ballot access and campaign finance laws have 
significant impacts on new minor party candidate emergence and development in the American 
states’ races for governor.  However, as interesting and useful as this case was, it will not be used 
as a data point in my analysis.  Because the Reform Party was already qualified for the 
representation on the ballot, Ventura did not have to overcome the same hurdles as new political 
parties must overcome to appear on the ballot for the first time. 
LEM AND DOWLING 
There is one study that has examined a remarkably similar topic to that of the research I 
present in this paper.  Lem and Dowling acknowledge the instrumental bias against minor parties 
in the U.S. and attempt to analyze why minor party candidates run for office.23  They attempt to 
analyze the impact of ballot access laws on minor party candidacy in gubernatorial election, and 
do so with significant results.  By looking at the political opportunity that is available by running 
for office and at the barriers minor parties must face to run, Lem and Dowling provide an 
analysis of all candidates other than Democrats and Republicans who run for governor from 
                                                 
22 Lentz 2002, 87-96. 
23 Lem and Dowling 2006, 471. 
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1982 to 2000.  They find that ballot access restrictions and political competition level are what 
matter most in determining minor candidate entrance into gubernatorial elections.24
 Despite these findings, Lem and Dowling’s study leaves a lot to be desired.  First, they 
claim to be looking at why minor party candidates choose to run for office, yet their analysis also 
includes independent candidates.  The nature of minor party candidates and independent 
candidates is completely different, and in most states, so are the laws that govern their access to 
the ballot.  For example, in Tennessee an independent candidate for governor only has to collect 
25 signatures to qualify for the ballot whereas in order to get a party label on the ballot as well, 
signatures of 2.5% of the number of people who voted in the previous gubernatorial election are 
required (41,329 signatures in 2006).  While this is the most extreme case, it provides a 
remarkable account of how minor party candidates and independent candidates are not treated 
the same.  Due to these laws, Tennessee has had as many as 13 independent candidates on their 
ballot for governor between 1995 and 2006 while during the same time period they have had no 
minor party gubernatorial candidates.  Since Lem and Dowling count all minor party and 
independent candidate appearances on the ballot in their model while only using minor party 
ballot access laws, their data is significantly thrown off in states such as Tennessee, Maine, and 
Louisiana.25  To correct for this, my analysis does not include any independent candidates.  I am 
not looking at why candidates run for office against the two major parties, but rather why people 
make the effort to see that a new minor political party emerges on the state level.        
 While their study is an excellent contribution to the literature about why minor party 
candidates choose to run for office, Lem and Dowling fail to get specific when it comes to 
analyzing each state’s unique ballot access laws.  Without providing the detailed discussion of 
                                                 
24 Lem and  Dowling 2006, 471. 
25 Lem and Dowling 2006, 474. 
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the requirements for new party emergence, their paper has still left a void in the literature that my 
study intends to fill.  Rather than looking at candidates running for governor, I am looking at 
new party emergence and development in gubernatorial elections.  This paper tackles the topic 
from the party perspective rather than focusing on the individual deciding to “throw their hat in 




















C.  HYPOTHESES 
 This paper explores factors that might contribute to new minor party emergence and 
success in gubernatorial races, and can be related to other elections throughout the fifty states as 
well.  There are many factors that influence why people vote and the way in which they vote, but 
this paper does examine those.  The main focus of this paper weighs heavily on the main barrier 
to new minor party candidates: ballot access laws that must be overcome to emerge as a new 
political party.  The paper will also examine the role of several other factors in determining the 
emergence of minor parties in the American states, as well as look at how campaign finance 
laws, among other factors, influence the percentage of the vote cast for all new minor party 
candidates.  Ballot access laws regulate the steps and processes that a candidate and party must 
go through to get their name on the ballot and have a chance at running for governor.   
HYPOTHESIS 1: BALLOT ACCESS 
States in which the laws make it more difficult for minor parties to gain access to the ballot will 
have fewer minor party candidates running for governor. 
Ballot access laws play a large role in regulating a candidate’s entry into political 
campaigns.  It makes sense for states with considerably stricter and more difficult ballot access 
laws to have fewer candidates run for the office of governor than states with less restrictive laws.  
If it takes considerably more effort, money, and time to collect signatures on a petition in one 
state than another, my hypothesis is that the state in which it is more difficult will have fewer 






HYPOTHESIS 2: CAMPAIGN FINANCE STRINGENCY 
New minor party candidates in states which have more stringent campaign expenditure and 
public finance laws will receive a greater share of the votes than will minor party candidates in 
states with no campaign finance restrictions. 
Limiting campaign expenditures and regulating public financing of gubernatorial 
campaigns will help level the playing field between all candidates, which works to the benefit of 
minor party candidates, at least compared to no regulation at all.  Minor parties benefit from caps 
on expenditures because the cap will usually reduce the amount of money spent by Republicans 
and Democrats without changing the total spent in the minor candidate’s campaigns.26  Public 
financing laws will also tend to benefit minor party candidates as they will increase the amount 
of funds given to smaller candidates in proportion to the major candidates as well as regulate the 
spending of candidates who accept these public funds, which will have much more of and impact 
on major parties.  Campaign finance stringency will make the candidates have more equal 
financial bases, thus allowing minor party candidates to be able to receive a greater share of the 








                                                 
26 Bardwell 2003. 
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D.  INDEPENDENT, CONTROL, AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 There are many factors that could be used to analyze minor party emergence, entrance, 
development, and success in gubernatorial races.  This paper looks at two key independent 
variables that could help explain this success.  Ballot access laws and campaign finance 
stringency are looked at for all fifty U.S. states to help predict the two main dependent variables 
of the study, (1) the number of new minor party candidates to appear on the ballot and (2) the 
percentage of votes cast for all new minor party candidates in gubernatorial elections.  Each state 
is researched over all regular gubernatorial elections from 1995 to 2006 giving my project 156 
elections to conduct research.  California’s recall election in 2003 was not included in my 
analysis as there were far too many candidates and the rules for candidate entry were not the 
same.  Control variables are used to analyze the data by presidential election year, election cycle, 
political competition, gubernatorial approval, and state ideology.  In addition, Elazar’s 
classification of states into three unique cultural categories is used to look at the differences in 
minor party emergence and barriers to success based on the cultural characteristics of the states 
in a path model analysis. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
BALLOT ACCESS LAWS 
The independent variable of ballot access laws was the most difficult, yet also the most 
interesting, variable for me to obtain.  My research consisted of searching website archives and 
state election statutes, e-mailing election officials, and telephone calls to secretary of state 
offices.  The ballot access variable began by taking a look at the different barriers to ballot access 
that exist in each state.  This was a two step process.  First, I tried to find out what it takes for a 
14 
 
new political party to be listed on the ballot for governor.  Then I looked at what the laws and 
statutes said about how a political party could retain ballot access in the state.   
 Ballot access laws vary considerably across states.  Most states have a requirement for 
some number of signatures on a petition.  This ranges from Hawaii, which requires signatures 
totaling one tenth of one percent (0.1%) of registered voters in the previous election to the state 
of Illinois which requires signatures equal to five percent (5.0%) of the number of people that 
voted in the previous gubernatorial election.  Some states, like North Dakota and Virginia, 
require a fixed number of signatures on a petition rather than a percentage of registered voters or 
previous voter turnout (7,000, and 10,000 respectively).  Petitions are not the only ways states 
decide which political parties can be listed on the ballot.  For example, Delaware requires that 
one twentieth of one percent (0.05%) of the previous year’s registered voters be registered for 
that party.  Vermont simply requires that the party be “organized” in ten towns with the 
appropriate paperwork filed.  There are also filing fees associated with the petitions that in some 
cases could deter a candidate from running for office.   
 There is also variation in the rules governing what it takes to stay on the ballot in future 
elections.  The most difficult states to achieve ballot retention are Alabama, which requires 
twenty percent (20.0%) of the vote in the gubernatorial election, and Kentucky, which requires 
twenty percent (20.0%) of the vote in the previous presidential election.  Other states range 
anywhere from one percent (1.0%) to ten percent (10.0%) of the vote total, or they reflect the 
original ballot access laws of registered party members or party organization.  A common 
occurrence is for a state to differentiate between a major and minor political party.  When this 
classification is made, it regulates the way in which parties nominate their candidates.  Major 
party status, which is harder to attain, requires that the political party nominate their candidates 
15 
 
through a primary election.  On the other hand, a party classified as a minor party may nominate 
their candidates in any way they see fit, such as a nominating convention, primary, or the party 
leaders just choosing the candidate (depending on the state).  The state of Washington’s election 
code states that a minor party can be formed by holding a nomination convention and attaining 
1,000 signatures.  Major parties should also nominate their candidate through this convention 
process.  If a party receives five percent (5.0%) of the vote in the election they can then be 
recognized as a major party, however, if they receive less than ten percent (10.0%) of the vote, 
they have the right to choose whether they want to be a major party and nominate by primary or 
a minor party and nominate at a convention.   
Another state with a unique way of electing officials is New York.  New York elections 
operate under a “fusion ballot” system whereby a candidate can be on the ballot for the same 
office under multiple party labels.  This multi-party nomination system provides a unique tactic 
to minor parties as the votes a candidate gets under the minor party label also go to the same 
candidate under a different party label.27  The fusion ballot allows a minor party to be the 
decisive factor in a close election between the Republican and Democratic candidates thereby 
taking away from the thought of minor party voting being a waste of a vote and adding to the 
potential spoiler effect.  While this system is certainly different from that of other states, the 
minor parties are still required to collect 15,000 signatures to appear on the ballot, so there are 
certainly still barriers to ballot access under the fusion ballot rules. 
 Finally, there are also other election rules that must be taken into account.  For example, 
in Indiana, the Libertarian Party is always automatically qualified for the ballot and they are free 
to nominate a candidate at a convention for every election.  While the Libertarian Party for all 
practical purposes is a “third” or “minor” party, they will not be counted in any of my analyses 
                                                 
27 The New Majority Education Fund: http://www.nmef.org/cobble_siskind.htm 
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for this project due to the fact that they will not be a new minor political party.  The same is the 
case for any party which qualified due to thresholds from the previous election, such as Jesse 
Ventura in Minnesota in 1998 under the Reform Party.   
 The largest contribution to the research on minor political parties from my study is my 
research and coding of ballot access laws for all fifty states.  I have sorted the states into five 
categories based on their ballot access laws and coded them as such for minor parties: 
“1” – Easy - Represents a state that has no signature requirement, a signature requirement with a 
percentage of previous voters that is half a percent (.5%) or less or a signature requirement that is 
set at 1,000 signatures or less. 
“2” – Medium Easy - Stands for a state with signature requirements set over half a percent (.5%) 
but equal to or less than one percent (1%).  States that have set limits at 15,000 or less also fall 
into category two. 
“3” - Medium - Used when the signature requirements mandate the number of signatures based 
on previous elections to be more than one percent (1%) but equal to or less than two percent 
(2%).  Also, a state that mandates that a new party must collect 1% or less of registered voters’ 
signatures will fall into this category. 
“4” – Medium Hard - Represents a state which has laws that require new political parties to 
petition from two percent (2%) to anything fewer than three percent (3%) of the signatures based 
on previous election turnout. 
“5” – Hard - Signifies a state that requires potential candidates to collect the signatures of over 
three percent (3%) or more of the previous election’s vote totals. 
Of the 156 elections that were examined, there are 32 coded as “1” for easy, 75 coded as 
“2”, 18 coded as “3”, 18 coded as “4”, and 13 coded as “5”.  During the period of 1995 to 2006, 
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only one state changed its coding, and that was Florida.  Florida was coded as a “5” during the 
election of 1998 but changed their laws in 2000 and Florida was coded as a “1” for 2002 and 
2006.  Maryland’s laws changed as well, but they have remained in category “2” since 1998.    In 
2007, Louisiana’s law change will take effect and its coding will change from a “5” to “1”.  
From 1995 to 2006, Louisiana’s laws were the most restrictive in the nation to new minor 
parties, requiring signatures of five percent (5%) of the registered voters in the state to get the 
party label on the ballot.  Table D.1 shows the rankings of the fifty states in each of the election 
cycles that have been examined.  As can be seen, Louisiana stays consistent during these cycles 
at 50th while Mississippi, as odd as it may seem, ranks 1st due to the fact that their only criteria 
for forming a new political party is just to be organized.  Vermont comes in second with a law 
that states that the party must be organized in 10 different towns throughout the state.  Florida 
makes the largest change in the rankings, moving from 49th in the first election cycle to 4th in the 
second and third cycles. 
The percentage of signatures required for ballot access is the most commonly used data 
item to separate the states into the variable categories.  The percentage is used instead of the raw 
numbers of signature requirements partly as a control for the population of the state.  Even 
though one percent in California is far greater than 1% in Rhode Island, it makes theoretical 
sense to group them close to each other.  Larger states, in addition to having more people to sign 
petitions, also have larger interests and more like-minded people that will be supportive of the 
causes of various minor parties.  In order to use the raw number of signatures required it would 
have to be done within the context of each state.  Collecting the volume of signatures is not 
always the problem facing minor parties, rather it could also be finding people to support their 
cause a year before an election in order to collect signatures.  For these reasons, I predict that the  
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Table D.1:  Ranking of State New Minor Party Ballot Access Laws from 1 to 50 
 
Election Cycle 1 
1995-1998 
 
 Election Cycle 2 
1999-2002 
 






5 Rhode Island 







13 New Hampshire 





19 North Dakota 
20 Massachusetts 
21 Missouri 
22 South Carolina 
23 Wisconsin 
24 Virginia 
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Loui iana s 
   
   
   
Rankings start with 1 as the easiest state to qualify as a minor party on a gubernatorial ballot and 50 is the most difficult state to 
gain access to the ballot as a new minor party.  Florida is the only state to move significantly on these rankings due to a change in 
ballot access laws between 1995 and 2006.  Maryland also changed their ballot access laws but did not see much of a change in 
ranking.  Louisiana’s laws have changed and it will be much easier for a minor party to get on the ballot in 2007. 
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percentages of signatures required will be more closely related to new minor party emergence 
than the raw number of signatures. 
If my hypothesis is correct, the data will show that as this variable moves from “1” to 
“5”, the number of new minor party candidates running will go down due to election laws 
increasing in difficulty.  States that are coded “1” and “2” should see significantly more new 
minor parties emerge than states coded “4” and “5”.   
CAMPAIGN FINANCE STRINGENCY 
The second independent variable that I am looking at is the stringency of the state’s 
campaign finance laws.  This measure is coming from a paper by Christopher Witko titled 
Measuring the Stringency of State Campaign Finance Regulation.  I am using the part of his 
index about public financing and expenditure limits.  Since fundraising is one of the biggest 
hurdles a minor party gubernatorial candidate has to overcome compared to Republican and 
Democratic candidates, it makes sense to look at how much each state uses public financing and 
expenditure limits to keep election spending down and make elections more competitive and 
equitable.28  Witko’s index has seven items, each one representing a level of stringency that will 
help level the playing field.  The seven laws that Witko coded are:  
1) Total expenditure limit 
2) Check-off on tax return form for contribution to public funding 
3) Independent revenue source for public funding 
4) Public financing of statewide campaigns 
5) Public financing of state legislative campaigns 
6) Public financing of political parties 
7) Equal distribution of public funds between candidates and/or parties 
                                                 
28 Malbin and Gais 1998. 
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The main laws that should influence minor party candidate success are the total 
expenditure limit and the equal distribution of public funds between candidates and/or parties.  
Still, every one of these laws should have implications for the overall level of campaign finance 
stringency that exists in a state and should give insight into the nature of a state’s campaign 
finance laws. 
The independent variable for campaign finance stringency is measured by a dummy 
variable where “0” is used to code when none of the seven laws are in place and “1” is used if 
any of the seven laws exist in that state.  If my hypothesis is correct, the data will show a positive 
correlation between the existence of campaign finance restrictions in each state and the 
percentage of votes won by new minor party candidates.  There is a large portion of states which 
have none of these laws in effect.  With no limits on campaign expenditures and no assistance 
through public financing, minor party candidates should be at a significant disadvantage.  On the 
other end of the spectrum Arizona was the only state where all seven regulations exist and 
Minnesota is the only state with a six.  The minor party candidates in these two states as well as 
the rest of the states coded with a “1” should have a more level financial playing field than those 
in other states, possibly leading to a greater share of the votes. 
It should also be noted that there are other ways that this variable could have been 
measured.  One way would be to use all seven regulations to make a scale from zero to seven as 
the measurement for campaign finance laws.  However, with seventy cases where no laws exist 
at all and eighty-six cases where there is at least one, it makes sense to look simply at the 
existence or non-existence of any campaign finance regulations.  This is especially so since there 
is only one state that could be coded with a six and one that could be coded with a seven.  
Another way to code the variable would be to only use the two laws that should matter the most 
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to minor parties.  These laws are theorized to be the total expenditure limit and the equal 
distribution of public funds between candidates and/or parties.  The problem I ran into when 
looking at this coding was that the data from Witko did not reveal which regulations each state 
has in place.  In the end, it made the most sense to code the variable as a dummy variable 
revealing whether or not any campaign finance regulations exist in each state. 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEAR 
 The presidential election year term is a dummy variable that is coded “0” for an election 
that was not in a presidential election year (1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2001, 2003, 2005 and 
2006) and coded “1” when the election was in a presidential election year (1996, 2000, and 
2004).  This dummy variable is going to be used to determine if there is a difference in minor 
party candidate emergence and vote share on the state level when people are going to the polls to 
vote for presidential candidates as well.  It may be the case that people who are going to the polls 
to vote for a major party for president will vote for that same party for governor and for other 
offices rather than switch to a minor party candidate on the state level.  Also, having the circus of 
presidential campaigns going on might dissuade some minor party candidates from attempting to 
run because their election will get no media attention compared to the presidential election and 
their voice will not be heard. 
POLITICAL COMPETITION 
Political competition could work in two different ways.  One thought is that a state which 
has lower party competition between Democrats and Republicans could create a better 
environment for minor parties than a state in which the Democrats and Republicans are very 
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competitive with each other.  If one party consistently dominates the other party, perhaps there 
could be a void in policy or a gap in ideology that a minor party could jump in and fill. 
 There is probably a better way to think about party competition.  It is possible that in a 
state with high party competition between the two major parties, minor party candidates could 
play the role of “spoiler” for the major parties.  The concept of the “spoiler vote” comes into play 
when the two major parties are neck and neck.  A liberal or conservative minor party could take 
enough votes away from the respective Republican or Democratic candidate to allow the 
candidate of the opposite ideology to win.  This has happened several times in Presidential 
elections, most recently Ralph Nader as a Green Party candidate is said to have received “spoiler 
votes” that would have otherwise gone to Al Gore and that is one of the reasons why George W. 
Bush won the presidential election in 2000.   
 The political competition variable is a dummy variable that is coded “0” if the previous 
gubernatorial election was close and “1” if the election was won easily by one major party or the 
other.  The threshold for this is 55%, which is consistent with Holbrook and Van Dunk’s 
measure of political competition.29  If the winning candidate received over 55% of the vote, 
political competition variable would be coded “1”.  If the winning candidate received 55% or 
less of the vote, the variable was coded “0”.  Due to this, I expect a negative relationship 
between minor party emergence and political competition because I think there are more reasons 
for minor candidates to get into tight races rather than races where everyone knows who will 




                                                 




 State ideology is a key variable that will be in my model for both hypotheses.  Taken 
from Erikson, Wright and McIver30, the state ideology variable measures the aggregated 
ideological leaning of the citizens of each state.  Erikson, Wright, and McIver have collected 
state ideology and partisanship data from CBS/New York Times national polls from 1977 to 
1999.31  In all, they collected 1,114 observations on state ideology and came up with a mean 
ideology score for each state in each year.  Unlike party ID, which has gone through significant 
changes over the past twenty to thirty years, especially in the south, state ideology has remained 
relatively constant.  Poll takers were asked to identify themselves as liberal, conservative, or 
moderate, and then the responses were aggregated to come up with state ideology variable.  A 
negative score implies a more conservative leaning from the state electorate while a positive 
score means the state aggregates out to be on the liberal side.  A score of zero would mean 
perfect balance and a completely moderate electorate when the citizens’ ideologies were 
aggregated.   
 The five most conservative states in 1999 were North Dakota, South Dakota, Alaska, 
South Carolina, and Tennessee while the five most liberal states from 1999 were Vermont, 
Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Rhode Island.  I have used the mean state ideology score 
from 1999 for all of my data points because the Erikson, Wright, and McIver data only goes up 
to 1999.  Since 1999 falls in between 1995 and 2006, and since there is not much fluctuation 
over time in state ideology scores like there is with partisanship, using the 1999 figures should be 
theoretically sound and a useful instrument for analysis.  I am expected a positive relationship 
between state ideology and the number of new minor party candidates that emerge in 
                                                 
30 Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993. 
31 Erikson, Wright, and McIver 2001. 
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gubernatorial elections.  The hypothesized relationship is positive because I expect more liberal 
states and more liberal citizens to think it would be good to break away from the traditional two-
party mold and allow other options to be presented via new minor political parties.  I expect that 
more conservative states and citizens would be happy with the current two-party system and 
would prefer to keep things the way they are.  This effect should be present in both the number 
of new minor party candidates and the percentage of votes they receive. 
GUBERNATORIAL APPROVAL 
The control variable on gubernatorial approval was taken from the U.S. Officials Job 
Approval Ratings (JAR) data set compiled by Thad Beyle, Richard G. Niemi, and Lee Sigelman.  
There were 10 out of the 156 elections in the study where no gubernatorial approval data was 
available.  For the other 146 cases where data was available, this paper uses the percent positive 
figure from the dataset for the previous governor in the poll as close as possible to one year 
before the election for governor that is being examined.  I took the poll one year away from the 
election because that is when minor party candidates would need to begin the qualifying and 
signature collecting processes in order to run for governor.  Since I wanted to use the 
gubernatorial approval data to model why candidates run rather than who the public votes for, I 
use ratings closer to the time of filing for office rather than closest to the election.  Because of 
this, the gubernatorial approval data will only be used to explain minor party emergence. 
 Since the percent positive and percent negative are inverses of each other, it did not 
matter which percentage I looked at, as long as I was consistent.  Since I am looking at the 
positive percentage of approval ratings, I am expecting a negative relationship between the 





 The election cycle variables are broken up into two dummy variables.  Election cycle one 
is coded with a “1” for the elections from 1995 to 1998.  Election cycle three is coded with a “1” 
for the elections from 2003 to 2006.  All elections not coded as “1”, including all of election 
cycle two from 1999 to 2002, are coded as a “0”.  My analysis is conducted for gubernatorial 
elections in all fifty states from 1995 to 2006.  Most states hold their gubernatorial elections in 
the midterm between presidential elections.  For these states, I have data from the 1998, 2002, 
and 2006 elections.  There are several states that hold their elections on presidential election 
years, which will have three elections in my study: 1996, 2000, and 2004.  Louisiana, Kentucky, 
and Mississippi have their elections the year before presidential elections; therefore I have cases 
for them in 1995, 1999, and 2003.  New Jersey and Virginia hold their election in the year 
following presidential election years (1997, 2001, and 2005).  There are two out of the fifty 
states that elect their governors every two years.  For these states, New Hampshire and Vermont, 
I have data for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006.  The purpose of the election cycle 
variable is to be able to test for differences between time periods, basically seeing if there was a 
difference in minor party emergence or minor party vote totals based on something else going on 
at a specific time.  By using two dummy variables for election cycles one and three, if there are 
any significant differences in the election cycles, the regression will show those differences in 
relation to election cycle two. 
OTHER KEY VARIABLE: ELAZAR’S POLITICAL CULTURE 
 Political scientist Daniel Elazar grouped the states into three categories based on their 
political cultures.  These categories, individualistic, traditionalistic, and moralistic (coded 1, 2, 
and 3 respectively), give a simple label to the cultural background of the states.  Moralistic states 
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are often marked by positive, active government and citizen involvement.  Moralistic cultures 
tend to believe in the greater good and that government can solve social problems.  
Individualistic cultures are those marked more by capitalistic states in which people try to 
advance themselves on their own and do not turn to government to solve the social problems of 
the day.  Traditionalistic cultures represent states which prefer to keep on doing things they way 
they have always been done.  They rarely see a need for change in society and government is run 
more by elites whose families ran the government before them than by caring citizens or 
professional politicians.32   
 Elazar’s classification of moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic states could be 
very closely related to the ballot access and campaign finance laws that states enact.  Moralistic 
cultures might prefer to see change in government and support parties which stand for ideals in 
society.  On the other hand, a traditionalistic culture may reject the idea of having minor parties 
and perhaps would argue that two is all there has ever been and two parties are all that is needed.  
Not only could this be reflected in the restrictiveness of ballot access laws to keep minor parties 
off the ballot and less stringent campaign finance policies to keep all the money and power in the 
hands of the two major parties, but it could also be seen in the percentage of vote for minor party 
candidates as even when they do manage to get on the ballot, the people in traditionalistic 
cultures will not support them anyway.  This idea will be interesting as I start to analyze the data 





                                                 




NUMBER OF NEW MINOR PARTY CANDIDATES 
The main dependent variable of this study is the number of new minor party candidates 
who appear on the ballot for governor in each state.  There are 42 cases out of 156 in which there 
are no new minor party candidates on the ballot at all.  This represents 26.9% of all gubernatorial 
elections from 1995 to 2006.  There is one minor party candidate in 54 cases and two minor 
party candidates in 30 cases.  All together, 80.8% of gubernatorial elections had two or fewer 
new minor party candidates appear on the ballot.  On the other end, there were two times that 
eight minor party candidates showed up, and in 1998, New York had nine minor party 
candidates.   
The number of new minor party candidates is used as the dependent variable to test the 
hypothesis of ballot access laws influencing new party emergence and candidate entrance into 
elections.  Since less restrictive ballot access laws should make it easier to get on the ballot, it 
would make sense to see more new minor party candidates when this is the case.  By contrast, 
when the ballot access laws create a difficult barrier to minor party candidates, there will 
probably be very few candidates from new political parties that run. 
PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE 
The second dependent variable in my analysis is the percentage of the vote that was won 
by all newly emerged minor party candidates in each of the 156 gubernatorial elections that I 
have examined from 1995 to 2006.  This data was collected from each state’s Election Division 
or Department/Secretary of State website or through emails and phone calls to those offices.  
Again, there are 42 elections in which there were no partisan candidates other than the 
Republican and Democrat, which equates to zero percent of the vote cast for minor party 
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candidates in those elections.  The percentages range from the 42 zeros to 22.9% for New York 
in 2002.  The mean for all 156 elections was 2.642% of the vote cast for new minor political 
party candidates.   
I use the percentage of the votes cast for minor party candidates as my measurement of 
success because it allows me to analyze many different election outcomes.  There are not many 
other ways to gauge success of minor party candidates since it is rare that they actually win.  In 
fact, there was only one case since 1995 in which there was a true success if successes were 
measured by victory alone, and that election is not even counted in my analysis because the 
minor party was already eligible to be placed on the ballot without meeting other requirements.  
It seems fair to say that a candidate who received sixteen percent of the vote was more successful 
than a candidate who collected two percent of the vote.  The variable I use for percentage of vote 
is a cumulative percentage of all votes cast for any new minor political party candidate in each 
election.  The figures only represent a single candidate when only one new minor party candidate 
was on the ballot.  Thus, I am really measuring the support for minor parties as a whole, or as 











E.  ANALYSES CONDUCTED AND FINDINGS 
 Predicting and evaluating new minor party emergence and success in gubernatorial races 
is a complicated and complex puzzle.  I am studying of the variation of this electoral 
development and success by examining two key barriers which might facilitate or depress new 
minor party candidates.  Do more minor party candidates run more when laws make it easier to 
get their name and party affiliation on the ballot?  Do more stringent campaign expenditure and 
public financing laws influence the way people vote due to a leveling out the monetary playing 
field of political campaigns?   These questions are certainly not the only questions to ask when 
assessing minor party entrance and success, but they should provide a quality starting ground for 
more extensive research on the subject. 
WHAT INFLUENCES THE NUMBER OF MINOR PARTY CANDIDATES WHO PUT 
THEIR NAME ON THE BALLOT? 
 
 Table E.1 shows the regression model for estimating the number of new minor party 
candidates that enter the race for governor.  As can be seen from the table, easier ballot access 
laws have a significant and positive effect on the number of candidates appearing the ballot.  
This finding supports hypothesis 1 and shows that ballot access laws should actually make a 
difference in the number of new minor party candidates that appear on the ballot for governor in 
each state.   
The implications of this are quite simple.  If states want more minor parties to gain access 
to the ballot and run for office, they can do so by reducing the barriers to ballot access.  
Likewise, if states prefer the two-party system and do not want any outside threats, they can 





Table E.1:  Minor Party Candidates in Gubernatorial Elections 1995-2006, All Elections 
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 Campaign finance stringency is also significantly related to the minor party emergence in 
each state.  When any campaign finance regulations are in place in a state, more new minor party 
candidates can be encouraged to seek the office of governor because they will know that they can 
receive some public funding or that at least the major parties will be somewhat limited in the 
amounts they can raise or spend. 
 Table E.1 also shows that the state ideology variable has a significant relationship with 
the number of new minor party candidates that enter into gubernatorial elections.  This is a very 
interesting finding as it points to the possibility that minor parties are a product of more liberal 
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citizens.  Although many of the more popular minor parties such as the Libertarian Party and the 
Reform Party seem to be moderate to conservative in nature, they, along with the more liberal 
Green Party and others emerge more often in states with more liberal citizens.   
None of the other independent or control variables are shown to be statistically 
significant in predicting the number of new minor party candidates that run for governor.  The 
adjusted r-square for the regression was .189, which means the model explains roughly nineteen 
percent of the total variance.  This leaves room for many other factors to play a role in the 
decision making of potential candidates when they decide to run for governor as a minor party 
candidate.  The model here does not take into account the partisanship of the state on an 
individual level. It is certainly a possibility that more minor party candidates will emerge in 
states where there are fewer registered Republicans and Democrats and more self-proclaimed 
independents.  Another reason why people could try to run for governor is because of distrust or 
disgust of the current government and feeling the need to do something about it.  The model 
attempts to capture this process, but the gubernatorial approval variable does not show up as 
significant.   It should also be noted that the regression was also run using the raw number or 
signatures required to gain access to the ballot in place of the one to five coding.  When run this 
way, the signature requirements did not show up to be a significant factor in explaining the 
emergence of new minor parties, further justifying the coding of the ballot access law variable. 
WHICH FACTORS IMPACT THE PERCENTAGE OF VOTE CAST FOR MINOR PARTY 
GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATES? 
 
 The regression model analyzing the percentage of votes cast for new minor party 
candidates can be seen in second column of Table E.2.  The adjusted r-square for this regression 
is .103, so it is explaining right at 10% of the variance.  This regression shows the state ideology 
variable to once again be significant at the .01 level, and the political competition variable is also 
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significant at the .05 level.  However, the model also shows that campaign finance regulations 
have little to no impact on the number of votes cast for new minor political party candidates.   
Hypothesis 2 stated that campaign finance stringency would be significant and positively 
related to the percentage of votes cast for minor candidates.  The findings in Table E.2 do not 
support this hypothesis.  This is a sign that campaign spending and the role of money, even in 
states that have campaign finance regulations, still heavily favors the two major political parties.  
Campaign expenditure limits place caps on the amount of money each candidate can spend on 
the election.  These restrictions generally only limit the amount of money that Republicans and 
Democrats are able to spend as most minor party candidates cannot raise enough money to reach 
that spending limit.33  Still, it is difficult for a new minor party candidate, who has no shot of 
winning, to raise any amount of funds that would be enough of a war chest to battle the two 
major parties.  Jesse Ventura was able to raise enough money to put up a fight, but he was not 
representing a newly emerged political party.  Public financing laws regulate the amount of 
dollars that the government gives to candidates to finance their campaigns.  The more of these 
regulations there are, one would think, the stronger the chances are that a minor party candidate 
could receive these funds.  However, it is more likely that these funds are given only to 
established parties and new minor parties do not see any benefit from public financing at all.   
Looking again at Table E.2, there is one extremely significant variable at the .01 level 
and one variable at the point .05 level.  Political Competition shows to be as significant in my 
analysis as it was for Lem and Dowling when looking at the percentage of the vote cast in favor 
of the new minor parties.  There is reason to believe that closer elections could help explain why 
some minor parties mobilize and emerge to run in gubernatorial elections.  State ideology seems 
to have a highly significant influence on the results of gubernatorial elections for new minor 
                                                 
33 Bardwell 2003. 
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 Table E.2:  Minor Party Candidates in Gubernatorial Elections 1995-2006, All Elections 
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party candidates.  Just as in explaining the emergence of new minor political parties, the more 
liberal states also cast more votes for the minor parties.  This association with liberals being pro-
minor parties and conservatives being anti-minor party can also be seen when looking at how 
political culture of the states can play a role in all of this. 
PATH ANALYSIS OF CAUSAL PROCESS 
Figure E.1 presents a path analysis of the causal process explaining the linkages between 
the key variables in the study.  Elazar’s political culture temporally precedes all other variables 
so the path analysis starts there.  The measure of political culture, coded 1 for traditionalistic, 2 
for individualistic, and 3 for moralistic, is negatively correlated with the coded ballot access 
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variable where 1 is easy to get on the ballot and 5 is difficult.  Therefore, it could be argued that 
the political culture of a state has a large influence on the type of ballot access laws the state will 
enact.  According to the correlation, moralistic states are more likely to have easy, less restrictive 
   
Figure E.1:  Path Analysis of Causal Process 
ballot access laws and traditionalistic states tend to have difficult, more restrictive laws.  
Individualistic states are apt to fall somewhere in the middle.  Elazar’s political culture variable 
is also positively correlated at the .01 level with state ideology, the number of new minor party 
candidates to run for governor, and the percentage of votes cast for new minor party candidates.  
Culture’s influence on state ideology is an important linkage in the causal process.  If moralistic 
states tend to be more liberal, this could cause less restrictive ballot access laws to be adopted 
and more individual voting for minor party candidates.  It has already been shown that state 
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ideology is a very significant variable in explaining the emergence of new minor parties as well 
as the percentage of the vote cast for those candidates.   
From there, the path analysis links ballot access laws to the number of new minor party 
candidates on the ballot.  This relationship was seen as being significant when the first regression 
was run as can be seen in Table E.1.  The ballot access laws are positively correlated to the 
number of candidates on the ballot.  Therefore, a traditionalistic state will tend to be more 
conservative, have more restrictive ballot access laws, which in turn tends to lead to fewer minor 
party candidates on the ballot.   
There is also a positive correlation between the number of new minor party candidates 
running for governor and the percentage of votes those candidates collectively receive.  This 
makes a tremendous amount of sense and is a factor that had not been looked at closely yet.  This 
shows an indirect effect on the percentage of votes that minor party candidates receive because 
the ballot access laws influence the vote percent through the number of candidates on the ballot.  
While state ideology is significantly correlated with campaign finance regulations, there are no 
significant correlations between those campaign finance restrictions and the number of minor 
parties on the ballot or the percentage of vote they receive.  Still, there may be something behind 
more liberal states having campaign finance regulations while more conservative states do not. 
Political culture is also correlated directly to the percent of votes that minor party 
candidates receive.  This gives the impression that not only does culture influence the laws that a 
state enacts, but it also plays a role in determining which candidates the citizens are willing to 
cast their votes for, which also occurs through the ideology of the state.  This means that a 
moralistic culture, being inherently more liberal, will tend to have less restrictive ballot access 
laws which will allow for more candidates on the ballot, thus increasing the percentage of votes 
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for minor party candidates directly through the votes of its citizens and indirectly through the 
number of candidates that are listed on the ballots.  Alternatively, a traditionalistic state will by 
nature be more conservative, have more restrictive ballot access laws which will reduce the 
number of candidates running for governor, and thereby reduce the percentage of votes cast for 
minor party candidates indirectly as well as have a direct influence on the vote because the 
citizens of a traditionalistic state are not as willing to vote for minor party candidates as those of 



















F. LIMITATIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
The journey to minor party emergence and success in gubernatorial races leads down a 
long and winding road.  The barriers I have examined in this paper, although somewhat 
significant, only scratch the surface of being able to explain and predict the parties’ emergence 
and candidates’ successes.  Ballot access laws were shown to have an impact on the number of 
new minor party candidates that enter into gubernatorial elections.  On the other hand, 
expenditure limits and public financing regulations were not shown to be very influential in 
explaining the variance in the percentage of votes that minor party candidates receive.  The role 
of political culture, political competition, and especially state ideology all play their own roles in 
minor party development as well. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
 There are numerous limitations that this study has come across.  It has examined the role 
that barriers to ballot access and campaign finance stringency play; however there are many 
other factors which put minor parties at a disadvantage that were not looked at in this paper.  
Access to debates and media coverage is a severe hurdle that minor party candidates must 
overcome.34  Being allowed to participate in a debate with the Democratic and Republican 
opposition adds a level of legitimacy and recognition to a candidate that they probably could not 
get in any other way.  Many states do not include candidates in debates who are not from major 
parties.  Likewise, the lack of media coverage for minor candidates digs them a hole they can 
seldom get out of.  Typically a minor candidate will either get no press, or, when they get do get 
it, bad press.  Very seldom do they get support from media outlets.35  Bad press, however, is 
often better than no press at all because it could be a free way to get a candidate’s name and 
                                                 
34 Lentz 2002. 
35 Lentz 2002. 
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platform out to the public for a campaign that is strapped for financial backing from the 
beginning.  This paper also fails to cover the partisanship of the state.  The partisanship of the 
electorate, as well as major party strength at the institutional level (rather than the electoral level 
as measured by political competition), could be another variable that adds to this research topic.  
States which have a higher percentage of independent citizens compared to registered Democrats 
and Republicans could see a greater share of the votes go to minor party candidates.  Also, if the 
two major parties are weakly organized in a state, there may be more opportunity for a minor 
candidate to jump in and take some of the votes.   
 The final variable that I would like to mention is the concept of personality and charisma 
and a measure of candidate quality.  When trying to model why people vote for certain 
candidates, it is important to think about the traits of the actual candidate.  This is a difficult 
measure to place in any model; however it is still a ghost in the story of explaining minor party 
success that is certainly out there.  The way a candidate handles him or herself, speaks about the 
hot issues of the day, and is seen as being able to lead the state are things that people will 
consider when voting regardless of party affiliation.  It takes money, time, energy, and dedication 
to win a gubernatorial campaign, but it also takes a candidate that can connect with the voters 
and offer them a reason to pick them in the voting booth.  There is certainly a “likability” factor 
that is extremely difficult to capture with statistics but is a huge part of elections at every level. 
 The variables which I have examined are limited as well.  Ballot access laws are difficult 
to code because of the extreme variation across states.  It is impossible to say how much more 
difficult it is to get on the ballot in a state coded with a “1” than it is in a state coded “2” or “5”.  
It may be better to have more than five options.  Perhaps a seven point scale would be even more 
significant but that would be incredibly difficult to code as it is hard to fit enough states in each 
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slot.  I tried running the regression with two other measurements of ballot access laws and 
neither were significant.  Neither using a one to fifty coding of the states in terms of ballot access 
difficulty nor using the raw number of signatures required for ballot access was significant in the 
model.  This makes me think that the one to five coding is a more accurate representation of how 
difficult ballot access is.   There are also states which could be coded differently for each aspect 
of ballot access, getting on the ballot and staying on the ballot.  Since this paper only looks at 
new parties getting on the ballot, it was the most important aspect of ballot access laws.   
 Witko’s campaign finance law index and Elazar’s political culture classifications have 
limitations of their own.  These limitations are similar in nature to the problems I had in coding 
ballot access laws.  It can be difficult to take any descriptive analysis and transform that into 
numbers with perfect accuracy.  No state is 100% moralistic, individualistic, or traditionalistic; in 
fact, every state has some aspect of all three.  Overall, however, I feel that the limitations of any 
of my independent variables are not enough to warrant throwing them out.  They are probably 
about the best that we can do right now when trying to make something such ballot access laws, 
campaign finance stringency, or political cultures quantifiable measures for statistical analysis.   
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 The major conclusion to get out of this study is that ballot access laws do influence the 
number of new minor party candidates that run for governor in each state.  This finding is of key 
importance in understanding the emergence of political parties in a two-party dominated system.  
The most important implication of this could come in the form of the spoiler vote that minor 
party candidates can present.  If the elections between Republicans and Democrats are close, 
then the role of minor parties can make a difference in the outcome of elections.  Still, this study 
seems to barely skim the surface of the story of minor party development on the state level.  
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There are many other variables that need to be discussed, plenty of other topics which need to be 
considered, and a lot of further research options, data, and ideas that need to be discovered.   
 The path analysis of the causal process may be the best summary of this research paper.  
It shows how political culture ties in directly to the vote share of minor party candidates as well 
as how, through an indirect path through ballot access laws and the number of minor candidates 
running, it can influence the vote share in a different way.  The same can be said about state 
ideology.  The regression model shows state ideology to have a significant relationship with the 
number of candidates as well as with the percentage of votes.  Also in the path analysis, ballot 
access laws play a role in determining the number of new minor candidates to put their name on 
the ballot, and that in turn influences the collective vote share of minor party candidates.   
In closing, if states want to move away from the old two-party system and allow for more 
freedom of choice in elections, they could start by freeing up access to the ballot to allow new 
minor political parties with fresh ideas to emerge.  But perhaps the most important thing they 
could do would also be the nearly impossible one: in order to really see change, the state’s 
culture and ideology would need to change first.  A state may also want to think about changing 
its election system away from a “first-past-the-post” “winner-take-all” system to one of 
proportional representation or at least a majority system with a run off.  Changing the ballot 
access laws would only be the beginning of the story of the emergence of new minor political 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE CODING AND HYPOTHESIZED 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
Hypothesis: States with less stringent ballot access laws will see more new minor party 
gubernatorial candidates emerge.  More stringent ballot access laws will decrease minor party 
activity. 
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